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ABSTRACT
The concept of hegemonic stability (Kindleberger, Gilpin) rests on the assumption that a leader
country, or a hegemon, provides a sufficient amount of public goods and builds a proper
infrastructure such as international law and international organizations. For a quarter century after
World War II, the United States played the role of a leader in order for international trade and
investment to flourish, and for the monetary stability of the Bretton Woods regime to be sustained.
In the context of the current world economy, the decline of the relative weight of the United
States, hegemon, will be a negative factor for the provision of public goods to the world. Bhagwati
suggests the phenomenon that an (so far) altruistic hegemon, that is the United States, has began to
disregard the multilateral process that is required for providing public goods and has started playing a
selfish role.
This paper is an attempt to review the concepts of "international public goods" and "hegemony"
from the standpoint of an economist. It focuses on the incentive structure that a large country or
hegemon as well as other countries face in order to make a collective decision. It is misleading, I
will argue, to treat many different situations in a single framework of 'public goods' or 'hegemony.'
The benefit-cost structure for nations in the trade liberalization process or trade conflicts is different
from that in the international monetary cooperation or in the choice of the international monetary
regime.
Specifically, where the provisioning of public goods is concerned, the small can exploit the large
by taking advantage of free-riding positions (Olson); where the trade of private goods is concerned,
the large countries can exploit the small with their monopoly power and trade restrictions.
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1. Introduction
After World War II, economic activities of the United States occupied a major part of the world's
economic activities. A large proportion of output was produced by the United States, and a large
proportion of trade originated from or was directed to it. In terms of the current account, it was
among the few major surplus countries in the world. Not only the magnitude of its economic
activities, but its political leadership excelled. The United States was the shepherd of international
agreements, cooperations, regimes, and international institutions.
The United States has joined military alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) and the Mutual Security Agreements with Japan, Korea and other countries. Moreover, it
has actively supported the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and has remained a
crucial player in the Bretton Woods System. For at least a quarter century after World War II, the
United States played the role of a responsible leader of the world which promoted and supported
growth of output, international trade and investment, and international monetary stability.
Reflecting on the role of the United States, the concept of hegemonic stability was developed by
Kindleberger (1986a, 1986b), Gilpin (1987) and others. 1 This concept rests on the assumption that a

•1 appreciate the discussions and encouragement on an earlier draft by J agdish Bhagwati and Mancur
Olson. The earlier draft was circulated as an IRIS Discussion Paper. I also thank Simon Evenett,
Christopher Clague, Mary Ann Dimand, Jun-ichi Goto, Ann Judd, Yusaku Horiuchi, Frances Rosenbluth
and T. N. Srinivasan for their helpful comments.
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"Hegemony" or "Hegemon" originated during the Greek era. According to the Larousse
Dictionary. in 224 B.C., Antigonos II of Macedonia organized the Hellenic Alliance of Greek cities and
called the alliance a hegemon Kindleberger (1986b) cites the Columbia Encyclopedia, which relates this
word to the struggles for dominance between Athens and Sparta.

responsible leader country of the world behaves in such a way as to realize the desirable state in the
world. The leader country, or the hegemon, is supposed to provide a sufficient amount of public
goods and to build a proper infrastructure that includes international laws and international
organizations. "World economic stability is a public good that has to be provided, if at all, by some
country that takes charge, accepts responsibility, acts as a leader" (Kindleberger, 1988, Introduction,
pp. ix). Without the leadership of a country in charge, the world is devoid of crisis management
capacity. 2
Beginning in the 1970s, the hegemonic role of the United States was overshadowed. The Bretton
Woods regime of fixed exchange rates depending on the dollar standard collapsed in 1971. The U.S.
current account started accumulating deficits on a yearly basis, and, consequently, the United States
became a large debtor country. The country started to be involved in many trade restricting measures
such as voluntary export restraints (VERs) and voluntary import expansions (VIEs) instead of being a
guardian of the free trade regime.
In accordance with the relative decline of the role of the United States in the world economy,
academic discussions of hegemony shifted their focus as well. In the 1980s, the main theme was
what would stabilize the world system given the fact that the United States was losing some of the
prerequisites of a hegemon. Hence came the discussions of what happens "After Hegemony"
(Keohane, 1984), or how a number of countries can form a privileged group for the supply of public
goods (Snidal, 1985).
Moreover, reflecting the self-centered U.S. attitude toward trade issues, Bhagwati (1994a, b)
argues that a previously altruistic hegemon, the United States, has recently stopped playing its
responsible role by often disregarding the due processes required for providing international public
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For example, the international disaster in the great depression was aggravated by the lack of a leader
country who could and serve as a lender of last resort.
2

goods and that it has started playing the role of a selfish hegemon. He focuses on the recent patterns
of U.S. trade diplomacy that rely on bilateral negotiations rather than multilateral negotiations through
international agreements or organizations.
This paper is an attempt to reexamine the concepts of "international public goods" and
"hegemony" from the standpoint of economics. I will focus my attention on the incentive structure
that a large country or hegemon as well as other countries face while they make individual or
collective decisions. I will ask what are and will be the economic consequences to the y.'Orld if the
United States loses further its position as a leader country.
Kindleberger has a paternalistic, if not benevolent, view of the leadership. "The father of
family --- usually has important responsibility and is often a leader" (Kindleberger, 1988, pp. 154).
Accordingly, he does not like the usage of "hegemony" which has overtones of force, threat and
pressure. He prefers the word "leadership". This paper, however, will explore the economic
implications of a hegemon who cannot be free from selfishness and clout for arm-twisting. The
reason for this as follows. To the eyes of economists, who are accustomed to regarding economic
behavior as the outcome of rational or individually selfish endeavors, it is strange that a nation, which
consists of an aggregate of selfish individuals, could behave altruistically. Thus, the concept of a
selfish hegemon is a natural one (Bhagwati, 1994a). Bhagwati argues that the United States became a
selfish hegemon because of the change in its position in the world economy. Instead, I would rather
argue that the United States was selfish when even its power dominated the world, but during that
time its selfish behavior roughly coincided with the world welfare. Now, however, the coincidence
has disappeared, and U.S. conduct reveals obvious selfishness.
In order to illustrate the basic logic of hegemonic stability, let us consider a manor where a feudal
lord (a hegemon) and many small farmers live. Suppose that the manor requires the supply of public
goods such as irrigation, roads, and a court system, and that the provision of public goods has the
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qualities of non-rivalry and non-exclusiveness. The lord occupies a large part of the land and,
accordingly, considers the state of affairs on the total manor as if the manor were his own state.
Thus the lord can take the total situation of the manor as his own and will provide public goods
because doing so is advantageous to him. On the other hand, small farmers can get a free ride on the
public goods supplied by their lord.
This story explains the-nature of incentive mechanisms concerning th~ supply of public goods.
By getting a free ride, the small can take advantage of the large (Olson 1965, Olson and Zeckhauser,
1966). However, if the relative weight of a hegemon declines, the provision of public goods will be
increasingly qeficient. The lord that has only a relatively small fraction of land will be less eager to
provide public goods. Furthermore, in the case of provision of private goods, the large may exploit
the small by exercising monopolistic power.
If we leave this hypothetical land and return to the present world economy, the decline in the

relative power of the United States, as long as it is a selfish hegemon, will be a negative factor for
the provision of public goods to the world. Is there a self-enforcing mechanism to compel nations to
provide international public good, or to commit to mutually beneficial rules without reneging?
On the one hand, the logic of collective action (Olson, 1965) effectively explains the incentive of
a large hegemon to supply an adequate amount of international public goods, and that shows small
countries can exploit large ones by free riding on the supply of public goods.
Models of international trade, on the other hand, give different answers. In the case of trade in
private goods, monopolistic (monopsonistic) power is relevant (Conybeare, 1987), and the large
exploit the small. In order to reconcile differences in predictions, we have to specify the situation
precisely because the result depends crucially on whether we are talking about public goods or private
goods.
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To explain the present behavior of the United States and the world system, one needs to appeal to
many theories in addition to the two basic paradigms described above, i.e., the theory of international
public goods and the theory of monopolistic behavior in the private goods domain. For example, I
will appeal to the theory that a nation has multiple political, economic, and military goals (Gowa,
1989), to the logic of two-level games (Putnam, 1988), to the analysis of rules and games (Ostrom,
1991), and to the concept of international organization as an epistemotogical community (Haas, 1992,
Keohane and Martin, 1994).
In this paper I will develop the following ideas:
(1) The negotiations needed for trade restrictions such as tariffs and quotas and those needed to
create international public goods such as a security or trade regime are completely different kinds of
games. The first is associated with private goods; the second is concerned with public goods. In the
latter case, the small exploit the large. In the first case the large may exploit the small. The
controversy between Conybeare (1987) and international public goods proponents can be better
understood if we are aware of these distinctions. Moreover, the role of regionalism in trade currency
and foreign aid issues can be analyzed only in terms of this distinction between international private
and public goods.
(2) Using Nash equilibrium terminology, the trade restriction game can be a strategic-complements
game, while the supply of public goods is always a strategic-substitutes game. In both cases, the
Nash equilibrium outcomes will be worse than the Pareto optimal for negotiating countries.
(3) At present, the United States is willing to exploit a part of its monopolistic power in trade even if
giving up its advantages of being a hegemon that supplies international public goods.
(4) It is difficult to explain U.S. behavior without referring to domestic conflicts as the theory of the
two-level game emphasizes. It is barely possible to understand VERs and VIEs from merely the
aggregate national economy point of view. The behavior of small nations must also be independent,
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in part, on the motives of some vest interest groups, because tariffs and other import restrictions
usually hurt overall national welfare.
(5) It is misleading to treat many different situations equally with a simple concept like 'public
goods' or 'hegemony.' Agreeing on an environmental treaty, agreeing on regional economic
integration, agreeing on a trade or monetary regime, and establishing an international organization to
manage a regime all involve different procedures and different degrees of commitment. One has to
be careful about what kind of commitment to action or inaction is made, and what kind of incentive
mechanism exists to impose sanctions on violators of rules.
(6) A dynamic framework is needed to account for the time-related distinctions among "once and for
all" mutual provision of public goods, international agreement or commitment, an emergence of a
regime (Krasner, 1982), and an establishment of an international organization. Concepts from
dynamic and repeated games, such as reputation building and time consistency, help us understand the
emergence process of an international regime.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief account of the extent to which
the United States, other advanced countries, and developing countries are either imposers or those
being imposed upon. Sections 3 and 4 illustrate, with simple examples, the incentive structures for
trade in private goods as well as for the provision of public goods among countries of different sizes
in the world economy.
In Section 5, I point out that many international conflicts and cooperation that have been
analyzed in terms of international public goods, a hegemony, or a regime do differ in the dynamic
properties and strategic structures of their political and economic processes. Based on the apparatus
and considerations reviewed in these sections, we will discuss, in Section 6, the question of how we
can explain the recent behavior patterns of the United States as a declining hegemon. The last section
discusses the role of regional arrangements that fortify or augment the function of a declining
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hegemon.

2. The Quantitative Significance of the United States in the World Economy.
Before proceeding to the analysis of the role of the incumbent hegemon, that is, the United States,
I will briefly review quantitative indicators of the country's relative importance in the world economy.
Table 1 indicates the share ·of output, and trade (export and import), for the United States, Japan, and
several EC countries in the OECD for the decades since World War II. The shares of the United
States in that magnitude declined slightly, while that of Japan increased very rapidly. The table also
indicates that ratio of the current account deficit to GDP.
The degree of trade protection has also changed over time. With the success in trade
negotiations, in particular the Tokyo Round negotiations in GATT, tariff rates in many countries have
declined during the postwar period. Tariff rates on trade in manufactures in 1974 averaged 40 per
cent. The average rate had come down to 7 to 10 percent even before the Tokyo Round multilateral
trade negotiations during 1974-79 (The World Bank, 1987). The Tokyo Round tariff cuts made the
average tariff rate on manufactures 6.0 percent in the EC, 5.4 percent in Japan (it made it even
lower) and 4.9 percent in the United States (see Table 2). The Uruguay Round negotiations that
started in 1986 reinforced this trend according to World Bank (1995). By 1993, industrial countries
had agreed on commitments on maximum tariffs for 99 percent of imports manufactured goods, and
had rendered 20 to 43 percent of imports duty free. The trade-weighted average tariff for
industrialized countries was cut by 40 percent, from 6.2 percent to 3.7 percent. The average tariff
rate for developing countries was cut by 30 percent (see Chart 1).
In spite of the progress in tariffs which have made it appear that the world is moving in the
direction of free trade, various nontariff barriers (NTBs) and "voluntary" restraints on exports have
plagued the world economy. Table 3 shows the degree to which imports of textiles and clothing, and,
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for comparison, manufactured goods, were subject to nontariff barriers in 1983 (Goto, 1989). Table
4 indicates the prevalence of multifiber arrangements (MF A), and VERs (later VIEs should be
counted), which the World Bank calls the "hard core" nontrade barrier. Moreover, the degree that
the United States relied on the non-tariff barriers was increasing (Table 5). Thus the world's pace
toward free trade was substantially disturbed by nontransparent restrictive measures. In fact, a
hegemon, the United States, and large advanced countries like Japan and the major European
countries were often engaged in imposing these types of nontariff trade restrictions on their imports
from developing countries. One of the major achievements of the Uruguay Round was "to agree to
eliminate voluntary export restraints within four years and the MFA within ten." (World Bank, 1995).
Whether this perspective may be too optimistic, the success or failure in abolishing of nontariff
barriers is important because large countries exercise their monopoly power in the world market in
the form of "sophisticated" or "modern" protectionism. This is the area in which one can observe the
monopoly power of large countries exercised, contrary to the common perception of public economics
that large countries will serve the interest of small countries.

3. A Hegemon, Country Sizes and the Supply of Public Goods
In this section and in the next, I will examine the strategic nature of international interdependence
in a world where countries are of different sizes. I will start with the case of public goods, which is
the principal theme in the theory of the logic of collective action.
Consider a situation already exemplified by the parable of a manor. A large participant, the lord,
is greatly affected by the supply of public goods and, accordingly, motivated to take responsibility of
supplying public goods. Even a selfish lord takes care of necessary irrigation or defense. However,
it does not always follow that he will be the privileged member (group) who provides a sufficient
amount of public goods. Since small farmers are tempted to free ride, the public goods produced are
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likely to be short of the most desired amount. A similar international situation can be analyzed by the
following analytical model. (For a discussion of the calculus of public goods, see Sandler, 1992.)
Consider a two-country world in which good 1 is a private good and good 2 is a public good.
The public good has, like environment or safety, the nature of non-rivalry and non-exclusiveness.
Each citizen and, accordingly, nation contributes a certain amount of income to the supply of
international public goods.· The hegemon has the population (normalized by the world population) of
1 - e, and the smaller country, the periphery, has the population of e.
Suppose the utility of representative individual in the two countries are respectively
213

(1)

C t

where

113

C2 ,

Ct,

d
an ,

.. 213

Ct

.. 1/3
C2
,

c2 are respectively consumption of private goods and public goods by the citizen of the

hegemon, and c;,

c; are consumption of private goods and public goods by the citizen of the

periphery country. 3
To each individual, a unit of income is given like manna in the form of private good 1, a part of
which she consumes as good 1, and the rest of which she contributes to the world community to
provide public goods. (The effect of the difference in wealth, or income, will be discussed later.)
Thus,

Here x2 and x; are the per-capita contributions of citizens in the two countries. The world per-capita
supply of the public good is assumed to be the weighted sum of these contributions:

The governments collect these contributions equally from individuals. They are assumed to play
strategically under the assumption that the amount of the contributions of the periphery country is

3

The same qualitative results can be obtained without assuming specific forms of the utility function,
but I rely on (1) for the sake of exposition.
9

given.

The Nash solution in this public goods game is given by the interaction of the reaction curves of
the two countries. One can derive the reaction curve of each country in terms of the contributions.
By maximizing utility (1), given the budget constraint (2) and public goods provision (3), and given
the value of x* or x* of the other country, we obtain as country 1's reaction curve.
(4)

Xi =

1

1 -

20 *
*
1
3x 2 ' and x 2 = 1

where Ois defined by 0

=

€

(1-€).

When

-

€

2
30 Xi'

< 1,

0

< 0 < 1.

A smaller value of e corresponds to

a smaller value of 0, that is, a larger relative size of the hegemon.
Figure 1 illustrates these reaction curves. If e and accordingly O are small, the reaction curve of
the hegemon does not diverge from the optimal provision of the public good x2

= 1/3.

In fact one

can easily ascertain that the contract curve (cooperative solution) lies on a curve that passes through
point (1/3, 1/3). On the other hand, when e and 0 are small, the reaction curve of the smaller
country diverges much from the optimal provision x;
.
. given
.
by Xi = -3 - 20
eqm·1·b
1 num
1s
-, an d x *
2
5

that O ~ {, or e

= 1/3.

The internal solution for the Nash

3 - 20 .
When the periphery country is so small such
5

~ ¾, the equilibrium strategy of the periphery country is x; = 0,

or to stop

contributing completely. As is indicated in the diagram, the small can exploit the large in this
analysis of the public goods.
Essentially, this approach was taken by Olson (1965) and in particular by Olson and Zeckhauser
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(1966), which draws a diagram like Figure 1. "There is a systematic tendency for "exploitation" of
the great by the small" (Olson, 1965, p.29). Few seem to be aware of the fact that this exploitation
property stems from the nature of public good. The exploitation by the small no longer holds in the
case of private goods, as will be shown in the next section.
One can extend this approach to a scenario in which many small countries coexist with a large
hegemon. Suppose that a small country occupies a fraction e of the world economy, but that there
are n small countries. Accordingly, the hegemon occupies the proportion (1 - n1:) of the world. The
hegemon's reaction function does not change except that 0 is now defined as ne/(1 - ne). Reaction
functions of the hegemon and the smaller countries are modified. That is, in the simplest
(5)

The behavior of larger periphery countries will diverge from optimal behavior, and that of smaller
countries will diverge even further downward (Figure 2). The resulting supply of public goods falls
short of the optimal, and smaller countries enjoy free-rider positions.
The Nash equilibrium supply of public goods is given by
(6)

Xi

={

1

20

2n + 1 (2n + 1)2

} /

{1- 4 }
(2n + 1)2

'

One can see that the hegemon increases its contribution as its selective population in the world
increases (0 decreases), and that peripheries reduce their contribution as 0 decreases. An increase in
the number of small countries n increases keeping 0 constant the contribution by the hegemon
increases and the contributions by small countries decreases. All are expected from the "exploitation
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by the small" hypothesis. Incidentally, the per capita public good is expressed as

and a decreasing faction of the number of small countries. I have been concerned thus far with
countries of various sizes but have assumed that incomes are identical. The world consists of
countries with different income levels among which burden sharing problems can be serious. The
next step is to introduce different levels of income to the case of two countries -- extension to a many
country case would be straightforward. Let the hegemon receive per-capita income y and the other
country receive per capita income y•. I will assume y

> y• for convenience but this assumption is

not essential. Equation (2) will become:
(2A)

The resulting reaction functions are:
(4A)

Xi

In terms of Figures 1 and 2, in this case the reaction curve of the hegemon starts from y/3 instead
of 1/3, and that of the other country starts from y*/3 instead of 1/3. From this one can conclude that
a large country tends to spend a larger proportion of its income for international public goods than
does a small country. This justifies the common procedure of testing the Olson-Zeckhauser
hypothesis by checking whether a large country spends more proportionately on military expenditures
as with income rises.

4. The Size of Countries in a Model of Tariffs
The story of the last section will be dramatically reversed if one considers the situation associated
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with trade of private goods (instead of public goods) and tariff wars. The nature of strategic
interdependence changes from strategic substitutes to strategic complements (Bulow, Geneakopolos
and Klemperer, 1985.) Also, the exploitation of the large by the small becomes the exploitation of
the small by the large.
Consider the simplest two-country Ricardian model where labor is the only factor of production.
In production of two goods·, 1 and 2, the larger country (hegemon) has input coefficients a1, ai; the
smaller country has input coefficients a;, a;. The larger country has a comparative advantage in
producing good 1 so that a1/a2 < a;ta;. The two countries have a labor endowment, Land L*, and

the larger country is large enough to warrant: max

Ll
L, [ al

az

> max IL*
- ,L*l
- . (Here Lis
*
*
al a2

assumed to be large enough. Instead, one could interpret the first country as being more productive
country so that either a1 or a2 is small enough to satisfy the inequality.) Finally, the utility function
of the representative consumer is expressed as an identical function of per capital consumption c1, Ci,
and c;,

c;, or U(c 1, ei) and U(c;,~.

Both governments are assumed to conduct their tariff policies

in such a way as to maximize the utility of the representative consumer.4
The offer curves for this model are shown in Figure 3. The case illustrated in Figure 3 is one in
which the hegemon is so large that the smaller country's offer curve intersects with that of the
hegemon on the straight line (with slope aifaz) through the origin. The smaller country satisfies the
definition of a "small country" and thus cannot take advantage of the elasticity of the hegemon's offer
curve. The hegemon can, on the other hand, impose an optimal tariff to exploit its monopolistic

4This is indeed a strong assumption because the interests of various sectors may be distinctly
different.
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power in export, or monopsonistic power in import, in such a way that its trade indifference curve
will be tangent to the offer curve of the smaller country, that is, at T.

If the size of the smaller country is very small, the gain accrued to the hegemon from imposing
the optimal tariff is also small. The gain in terms of trade does not bring substantial welfare gain
because the amount of trade is limited (see point S in Figure 4). China would not gain much from
imposing tariffs on imports from Monaco. The gain from a tariff is larger if the smaller country has
some magnitude in the_ world economy (see point M).
The two country assumption can now be relaxed. Suppose there is one hegemon and n smaller
countries. Point M of Figure 4 illustrates the case in which n

= 2.

There is no incentive for smaller

countries to impose tariffs on imports, since they cannot change the terms of trade offered by the
hegemon, and, therefore, the same utility level as point M can be enjoyed by the hegemon while the
smaller countries are both left at point S.
The strategic situation can be depicted by reaction curves in the space of the tariff rate of the
hegemon t and that of the smaller country (or countries) t* (Figure 5). In this Ricardian situation the
reaction curve of the smaller country (or countries) coincides with the horizontal axis. The reaction
curve of the hegemon starts upward from the optimal tariff

t.

Therefore, the Nash solution N is the

combination (t , 0), which coincides with the von Stackelberg solution with the hegemon as the
leader. The smaller country (or countries) has no incentive to be a leader.
It is well known that when the two (or more than two) countries have similar size, more complex
situations emerge in which a tariff by a single country triggers retaliation by the other. Here the
reaction curve may take the property of strategic complements rather than.that of strategic substitutes
(Bulow, et.al. 1985). The situation of strategic complements arises when the tariff rate of a foreign
country triggers a rise in the tariff in the home country.
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In this situation concerning private goods and tariffs, a large country is motivated to be a von
Stackelberg leader and to exploit small countries. In a trade of goods situation with tariffs as
instruments, the hegemon will thus be able to manipulate the terms of trade to its advantage.
Therefore, we may say, contrary to Olson's expression, "the large exploit the small." If this case is
generalized to one in which there is a productivity difference such that a1 < < a;, and/or a2 < < a;

( < < indicates a large diff-erence), then it is possible to say, "the rich exploit the poor."
In the Heckscher-Ohlin model with multiple mobile factors of production as well in the Viner
model with an immobile factor of production, the offer curve of a large country no longer has an
exactly linear segment. Still, a large country has an almost linear segment and our strategic results
will hold without qualitative modifications.
In a more modern version of international trade theory with increasing returns and with the
oligopolistic situation, a similar situation will emerge. The only difference is that the case of strategic
complements usually takes place. As demonstrated by Gros (1987), and developed by Krugman
-

(1991), the reaction function of a large country starts with a certain tariff level and is then a declining
function of the tariff rates of smaller countries. (See also Goto and Hamada, 1994)
Conybeare (1987) claims that trade issues are primarily the benefit and cost associated with
private goods and relative prices. From the above discussions, it is possible to understand the reason
that the logic of collective action ceases to hold there, and that the large may exploit the small. We
will discuss later why, in the real world, large countries do not necessarily impose, or do not threaten
to impose, high duties on the products of small countries.
On the other hand, agreeing on a rule with spillover clauses such as the most favored nation
(MFN) clause, establishing a free trade regime like the GATI, and building an institution like the
WTO is a process of creating public goods. Rules and institutions have externalities and possess the
nature of public goods as will be di&cussed below. This is a different kind of game than the game
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that is played by tariffs, quotas, and non-trade barriers. The controversy between proponents of the
hegemonic stability approach and proponents of the trade-taxing game (Conybeare, 1989) will be at
least clarified, and even resolved, by recognizing the distinction between the creation of public goods
and the interplay of strategic instruments in the game that involves private goods.

5. Cooperation, Regimes, International Organizations and Public Goods
The strategic interaction of nations can have many different patterns from the two simplest
abstract examples we have studied above. The first is extreme in that it assumes the existence of a
pure public good that is completely nonexclusive and nonrival consumption; the second example is
extreme in that the strategy is limited to tariffs. Many conceptual issues need to be clarified in order
to apply these analytical tools to actual problems.
In international political economy, the words "international public goods" are used quite
ambiguously, resultin~ in many different meanings. Whenever one hears the words "international
public goods," their exact meaning should be scrutinized. Often the use of the concept "public
goods" may be ultimately justified, but it may refer to many varied entities or situations, from
concrete goods or environment, to conventions that countries find useful to follow, to agreements with
or without sanctions against their breach, or to the functioning of an international institution in the
management of public goods.
First, as many authors do, it is necessary to distinguish the pure public good, whose consumption
is nonexclusive and nonrival, from the "club" good, whose consumption can be exclusive and
competitive. The environment is probably an example of the first, and unified currency for a region
or a free trade area are both examples of the second. However, there is always a grey area in this
distinction. For example, a unified currency for a region benefits primarily the residents in the
region, but it also has a positive externalities or spillover effect to people outside the currency union
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by reducing their calculation and transaction costs. Defense can be considered as a club good for an
alliance. However, to the extent that externalities or nonmember nations are substantial, it can take
the flavor of an international public good.
The incentive mechanism for a public good studied in Section 3 is modified if the good is a 'club
good.' In addition to examining whether a scheme supplies the right amount of public goods, the
question of whether there is an incentive scheme to keep the number of club members optimal needs
to be asked.
Second, it is important to identify how the cost of providing an international public good is paid.
In most cases, the cost is paid in terms of private (non-public) goods or services. To provide
security, countries fund military budgets. To clean the air and produce better cars for the
environment, countries add additional materials and labor.
However, in many cases, commitments to actions and, particularly, commitments to inactions
constitute the substance of creating public goods. To clean the air, we may reduce the amount of
driving; to clean water, we may restrict polluting industrial activities; and to protect the ocean, we
may restrict fishing. In the field of international finance, the commitment to intervene, or the
commitment not to intervene in the exchange market, decides the choice of an interactional monetary
regime between the fixed and the flexible exchange rate. With respect to the main concern here, the
commitment to inactions, that is, not to impose tariffs,. is essential to the free trade regime. 5
In accordance with these remarks, international public goods can now be classified into the
following categories: (i) pure public goods, like defense and the environment, which are produced by
sacrificing some private goods of member nations, and which are nonexclusive and nonrivalry;
(ii) club goods, like the monetary benefit of a currency union, which can be enjoyed by participants

5

Most of the examples are externalities concerning individual consumption. But, these externalities
create the question of externalities of national public policies.
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who pay the cost but cannot be fully exclusive; (iii) unilateral mutual commitments for certain actions
or inactions; (iv) a combination of any of the above three elements that are organized in such a way
as can be called a regime or an order; and (v) the services of international institutions that manage
regimes.

(i) Pure Public Goods:
Safety from an (possible) enemy is certainly a public good. In order to attain the service of this
public good, nations sacrifice a part of goods and services. The service from defense usually satisfies
the nature of inexclusiveness and nonrivalry. Here the logic of collective action (Olson, 1965; Olson
and Zeckhauser, 1966) is applicable. Similarly, environmental activities such as protection against
pollution, congestion, or preservation of species should belong in this category. In this case, as is
illustrated above, a large country tends to bear more of the burden of producing public goods. The
small exploit the large.

(ii) Club Goods:
Regional economic cooperation, regional economic integration, and regional currency integration
are typical international club goods. A military alliance in a particular region can partially be a club
good. Thus, the distinction between the pure public good and the club good can be subtle.
Nevertheless, it seems to be useful to discuss regional trade or monetary cooperation in this category
of club goods.
First, a participating country gives up certain private goods in order to participate in regional
cooperation or integration. In the case of a regional free trade area or customs union, a country gives
up the right to impose tariffs (often above a certain rate) on the goods from the member of the free
trade area and, in the case of a customs union, in addition the right to choose freely the rate of a
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tariff to the rest of the world. Once collective actions generate a public benefit, the benefit will be
enjoyed mainly by participating members. In the case of the creation of a free trade area or a custom
union, the spillover effects are negative (e.g., Goto and Hamada, 1994). Trade is created within the
area, but trade is diverted from the rest of the world according to Viner's 'trade diversion effect'.
This implies that if the decisions left to the initiative of individual nations are too many, customs
unions or free trade areas will be created and they can become too large (see, e.g. Krugman, 1984).
In the case of a monetary unification or close exchange rate coordination, the cost for a country is
its sacrifice in stabilization policy. Countries give up the merit of domestic macroeconomic
stabilization to attain stability or predictability in exchange rates. The sacrifice is in private goods in
terms of the income losses due to restricted macroeconomic policies. The potential gains are public
goods because the benefit of unified currencies is common to all the participating nations. Some
benefits even extend to the rest of the world. In contrast to customs unions and free trade areas, the
spillover effect is positive in the case of a currency union or currency unification. If European
currency is unified, North Americans need not convert money while traveling, nor prepare for the
currency risks among European currencies. Therefore, there will be too few currency unions, or
currency unions will become too small, if their formation is left to national initiatives. (See, for its
political-economy aspect, Hamada, 1987; Hamada and Porteous, 1993.)
The time profile of benefits and costs have to be considered as well. The economic cost of
foregoing stabilization policy is immediate. On the other hand, the benefit from stable or fixed
exchange rates, as well as the benefit from a unified currency, will come years after. Therefore, it is
difficult to reach an agreement for stable exchange rates and a unified currency. The recent European
monetary turmoil, which began in 1992 and occurred just before the planned target date for
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integration, illustrates the difficulties involved in monetary unification.6

(iii) Commitments of Participants to Actions or Inactions:
In many of above examples, countries do not just provide private goods or public goods for a
collective action. They promise or commit themselves to engage in certain actions or to refrain from
them. In a free trade area,- member countries commit themselves not to impose tariffs on the goods
from member countries; in a customs union, member countries do the same as above and, in addition,
they commit to impose identical rates of tariffs on the goods from non-member countries.
During the formation of a currency union, countries promise that they will intervene in the
exchange rate market to keep their currencies at an agreed upon exchange rate or within an agreed
upon range. The flexible exchange rate is the regime in which countries promise that they will not
intervene in the exchange rate market. This is therefore often called a "non-system."
In terms of a dynamic game framework, two questions are important. First, is the commitment
or promise credible? The Bretton Woods Regime collapsed in 1971 because the credibility of the
vehicle currency was in doubt. One of the reasons for the success of the monetary union of East and
West Germany was that it was much more credible in advance in the case of the European union.
Second, does the presence of a hegemon help credibility? The answer to this is probably affirmative.
Until the middle of 1960s, the United States was the dominant economic power, and, accordingly, the
commitment by the United States was taken with more credibility. It has taken the initiative to
commit to free trade and the fixed exchange rate regime, and it seldom showed any sign of reneging
on its commitment. Now that the relative importance of the United States has declined in the world,
the country does not necessarily have sufficient incentive to play world leader, that is, to provide an

6

On the other hand, the German monetary unification seems to imply that unification of currency is
feasible in the presence of political unity.
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adequate amount of international public goods. Nor do other countries trust completely the
commitment of the United States to serve as a leader. This leaves the world in an age of uncertainty.

(iv) International Regimes:
The definition of an international regime is frequently debated by political scientists and
economists. Cooper (1975) defines a regime as a particular set of rules and conventions governing
monetary and financial relations between countries. "Regime" is, in a sense, more general than
"system" or "order" because the latter imply systematic and consistent rules and conventions.
"Regime" is distinguished from "agreement," because one does not regard a once-and-for-all, ad hoc
international agreement as a regime. The words "regime," and "rules" or "conventions" suggest a
situation where agents themselves interact with each other repeatedly following specific patterns of
behavior.
Some political scientists define a regime in a more strict fashion. Many authors in Krasner, ed.
(1982) take a consensus view: A regime is "a set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and
de_cision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of
international relations." Here principles are defined as "beliefs of fact, causations, and rectitude,"
and norms are "specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action." Decision-making procedures are
"prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice" (Krasner 1982, p. 2). The role
of expectations is emphasized.
To understand the importance of expectations, we should pay attention to the dynamic nature of
the role of international agreements, and regimes should be considered. 7 If countries agree on a

7

A popular common discussion in the dynamic theory of trade is that of the infant industry. If the
industry to be protected is under increasing returns to scale, external economies, learning by doing, in
such a way that competitive price mechanism cannot capture th.e total benefit, then there are cases for
protection of an infant industry. Then some of the protectionistic attitude taken by smaller developing
countries can become explicable. However, protection can be often attained not so much by border
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certain set of rules, it is usually under situations in which economic activities can be repeated
following these rules. Commitment to action or inaction already presumes some sequential or
repeated behavior, and it is particularly reflected in the definition. In other words, the situation is
usually that of a sequential game or repeated game. If nations precommit to their behavior in the
future, trust others' commitments, and, in fact, deliver on their commitments, then the world will
proceed without serious problems. If a country does renege its commitment, then the situation will
becomes difficult if not more interesting.
In the above definition, the phrase "expectations converge" is an addition to the conventional
definition of a regime. To economists, this phrase sounds vague. Do they talk about the convergence
of an entity of expectations? Do they converge over time or across countries? If there is no common
knowledge among nations, how can they find a way to learn? Agreement is only the first step in the
learning process. If I take a more sympathetic position to political science, they probably mean the
following. People have expectations about what will be going on, and the expectations are
converging. Therefore, the regime, according to this definition, essential entails a rational
expectations equilibrium. Not only is an agreement made, but agents expect that other parties will
follow the rules. A hegemon definitely helps to build a regime. The role of common knowledge is
important. If countries share common causal knowledge, they will find it much easier to cooperate or
coordinate economic policies (Haas, 1992). They will build an epistemic community, "a network of
professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and authorities
claiming policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area" (Haas, 1992). If these
professionals can help create common knowledge on the economic mechanism, obstacles against
coordination will be moderated. (For the obstacles in the world where perception of the model is
different, see Frankel and Rockett, 1988.) The common expectations on the part of the public, which

measures, like tarifffs, as by domestic measures.
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a regime requires, will emerge more easily.
It is important not to be too optimistic, however. First, in economic issues, specialists do not
always agree on what is policy-related knowledge (Frankel and Rockett, 1988). Second, if they agree
on common knowledge, countries and/or groups within a country may have conflicts of interest
among them. · Under certain situations, agreement or the understanding of a regime should be left
"incomplete" (Koehane and Martin, 1994), and the ambiguity from incomplete contracts may help to
bind participants in a regime. 8
The way to sustain the situation of repeated game is the trigger strategy. Sanctioning against the
reneging is the means to achieve the mutually beneficial results. The low rate of time discount rate
helps to sustain of the equilibrium.

In a time of peace, when the discount rate is low, this can be

done more easily.
Ostrom (1991) clearly illustrates this for "common-pool resource (CPR)." CPR is like a lake
where the long-run public interest to conserve fish conflicts with the private interest to catch fish now.
Most environmental problems belong to this category. She points out not only the need for
coordination, but traces the emergence of coordination. She considers the situation to be the Kreps
finitely-repeated game in which one of the sequential equilibria is a desirable solution. "It will pay
one player to signal to other players an intention to cooperate, in the hope that they will reciprocate
for a series of mutually productive plays" (Ostrom, 1991, pp. 43). In order for the commitments
made by players to be credible, either external coercion is needed, or some self-organized mechanism
of mutual monitoring should evolve. Almost all of Ostrom's discussions can be translated to the
question of an international regime. General implications would be that the existence of a hegemon
helps, but that an appropriate regime may emerge in a synergic manner if agents are patient enough.

8

An oriental diplomat coined a phrase, "instrumental ambiguity." According to him, nations cannot
agree if everything is expressed clearly. By leaving ambiguity, nations are motivated to participate in
a joint action.
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In the time of crisis, one becomes impatient. 9 At this time, some political leadership, rather than
rules or a regime, is needed for discretion (Jackson, 1991). The savior at the crisis stressed by
Kindleberger can be interpreted by this. "Rules are desirable on trend. In crisis the need is for
decision" (Kindleberger, 1988, pp. 139).
When the United States was, by itself, a privileged country which could provide sufficient public
goods independently, the United States could enjoy the stability of a free trade regime. It hardly had
any intention to break the rules. The recent selfish or regime-eroding U.S. attitude may be traced to
its lack of patience. In other words, its political, if not economic, discount rate might have become
higher in this more disturbing period.

(v) International Organizations
Building an international organization is also a subject of the calculus of participation. Nations
agree to build an institution as long as the merit of building an institution exceeds the cost of creating
it.

The logic of collective action works in this case as well. When the positive spillover or

externalities stemming from international organizations exist, as is often the case with the outset of an
organization, the pace of formation of international organizations by voluntary national initiatives can
be considered to be short of the desirable pace. Through an international organization, monitoring
national activities, giving sanctions against internationally illegal activities, and accumulating
knowledge for future prospects becomes easier. In many cases, international organizations will
facilitate the creation of an environment in which commitments by nations become more credible.
Keohane and Martin (1994) ask why and under what circumstances countries are willing to
delegate their functions to an international organization. Their discussion focuses on information and

9'falking about fishery Ostrom (1991) says, "Discount rates are affected by the levels of physical and
economic securities faced by appropriators. Appropriators who are unc.ertain whether or not there will
be sufficient food to survive the year will discount future returns heavily ---."
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the distribution of welfare. By establishing an international organization, countries can improve the
flow of information and can thus create the critical information required for the coordination of
policies. When there are multiple equilibria, the sharing of information is crucially important to
choose the best among these equilibria. The international organization is an epistemological
community (Haas, 1992). By nature, some agreements have to remain "incomplete contracts." To
keep fairness among members in case of an unforeseen contingency, the linkage among many issues is
useful (c.f., Gowa, 1989). The interaction between delegating issues to an international organization
and delegating them to domestic politics is systematically described in Keohane and Martin (1994).
Economists often consider this issue from somewhat different angle. After an international
organization is established, it begins behaving more or less independently . 10 Indeed, some officials
of the institution are from member countries and advocate policies of their home countries, but the
secretariat of an institution will develop and start developing independent ideas and then preferences.
Delegation is considered as a common agency problem, in which many countries, as principals,
delegate a task to an international organization. Economists are concerned with the principal agent
relationship in this delegation (Grossman and Helpman, 1994). They ask how the contract between
countries and the international organization can be written efficiently and how possible conflicts of
interest can be resolved among principals who do not necessarily possess a common goal.
In this respect, bureaucracy is a necessary ingredient of an international organization. It is thus
quite possible that an international organization may acquire, in time, the rigidity, in addition to the
information advantages of a bureaucracy, and, therefore resist changes in the policy of the institution
that becomes necessary when external conditions change. Bureaucracy may by itself "lock in"
activities of the organization. Thus it becomes a serious task to build some possible incentive

10

According to conventional view, the IMF is under European, the World Bank is under American,
and the Asia Development Bank (ABD) is under Japanese control. The nationality of the presidents in
these situations seem to support this view.
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structure for the institution for participating nations to avoid the incidence of Parkinson's law, while
keeping the useful functions of an international organization. It is difficult as well as important.

6. Can We Explain the Symptoms of A Declining Hegemon?
Sections 3 and 4 have shown two completely different implications for the effects of country size
depending on whether the issue involves private goods or public goods. Given these possibly
opposing effects, it is possible to explain typical phenomena of the present international order as
symptoms of a "selfish" or rational declining hegemon?
First, the logic of collective action seems to explain why the United States recently adopted
protectionistic policies by the imposing VERs and VIEs as well as by its threats to impose them.
Since the relative economic and political weight of the United States is declining, as shown in Section
2, one may argue that U.S. commitment to the responsibility of keeping a regime of free trade, which
has the public good character, has also declined. The "new" protectionism measures are virtually a
breach of the international economic order and erode the reputation of the United States. However,
the United States seems to prefer reaping the instantaneous gains that accrue in the private good
domain.
According to the model explained in Section 4, a large country has., in general, incentives to
appeal to the optimal tariff in the trade negotiating game. But it may have another argument in its
utility function. The United States practiced free-trade policy presumably because the merit of
providing a free trade regime and building a regime of pax americana was more important to the U.
S. government than realizing the fruits of monopolistic tariffs. The benefit from public goods was
supposedly more important than the opportunity cost in terms of private goods. Therefore, if the
United States has recently shown reluctance to bear the major burden of providing international public
goods, this would imply some of the following factors.
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Therefore, the relative economic and political magnitude of the United States have recently
declined. The United States no longer serves as the police for the world and, therefore, can hardly be
I

a guardian of world peace or the environment, or be meddlesome in many economic and political
conflicts around the world. On the other hand, neither Germany or Japan is fully ready to assume the
leadership role and begin pax germanica or pax japonica.
Second, after the end of the Cold War, defense has lost some of its importance as an international
public good. Therefore, it is no longer of eminent priority for the United States to provide the free
trade regime· as a means of sustaining the military stability under her initiative.
Incidentally, there has been a change in the strategic structure of the defense expenditure game
since the end of the Cold War. When the Communist Bloc was considered to be the threatening
enemy of the Western Bloc, led by the United States, the public good nature of defense expenditure
could be analyzed by the Olson-Zeckhauser apparatus. Small countries could take advantage of the
free ride possibility, and the United States bore the burden more than proportionately. Defense was
certainly public "goods" for the Western Bloc.
Since the Cold War ended, defense expenditures are spent in order to defend each country from
other countries. The loss to any nation can be considered to depend roughly on the difference
between the average holding of weapons of a potential adversary nation and the holding of weapons
of the particular nation. Under this situation, instead of trying to free ride, players try to accumulate
weapons in order to beat their neighbors. The structure of the Nash game changed from that of
strategic substitutes to that of strategic complements after the collapse of the Berlin Wall. (For these
concepts, see Bulow, et.al., 1985; and for the application for strategic structure, see Hamada, 1995.)
Under the situation of strategic substitutes a country's defense expenditure discourages the other's
expenditures, in other words, it creates free-riding incentives. Under strategic complements, a
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country's defense expenditures escalates the other's --- this generates a situation similar to a different
type of prisoners' dilemma from that under the Cold War. Here the undesirable situation is excessive
armament of countries. Defense loses its public goods aspect and assumes the public "bads" nature.
Not only large countries, but also small countries, attempt to accumulate more weapons than are
necessary. In contrast to the Olson-Zeckhauser result, a small country may spend a greater
proportion of its income on defense than a large country. Acquisition of munitions in East and
Southeast Asia may be seen as an example of the strategic complements structure.
Third, the role of the discount rate is important. Many interventions by the United States into
the rules of free trade make one suspect that the U.S. national discount rate has increased. In the face
of many internal problems, Americans no longer seem to be patient enough, at least in the political
economic sense, to sacrifice present gains in order to sustain the free trade regime for the future
benefit.
The consideration of the multiplicity of public goods and the linkage of trade issues to political
public goods like defense (Gowa, 1989; Keohane and Martin, 1994) also help to explain the present
phenomena. The temporary gain from new protectionism is one dimensional, all measured in present
economic gains. However, there are many kinds of public goods that the United States provides as a
hegemon: military security, trade regimes, investment regimes, protection of intellectual property
rights, an international monetary system, and so forth. Even though material benefits from each
international public good is not substantial, the consideration of a set of public goods, or a particular
combination such as trade and security, could have been sufficient to make the United States behave
well in trade issues. Now that the relative size of the United States has declined and that the external
environment for security issues has changed because of the collapse of the Berlin wall, then the
United States may prefer a present gain.
Basically, however, the above theories so far explained can fully explain neither the trade barriers
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in small countries nor the new protectionism in developed countries including the hegemon, the
United States.

The theories fail to explain the prevalence of protection in many small developing

countries, because, according to trade theory, small countries do not gain by tariffs or quotas (with
the possible exception of dynamic infant industry effect). If a country is small in economic scale, it
cannot change the world terms of trade and, accordingly, its national income cannot be increased
from trade restrictions.

Only when the layers of conflict discussed in two-level games are introduced

will it be possible to explain the protectionistic practices of small countries.
The above theories, based on the "Third Image" level (Gowa, 1994) fail to explain the
prevalence of new protectionism, that is, the prevalence of commodity arrangements like MF As,
VERs, and VIEs by the initiative of advanced countries. The United States is instrumental in
pursuing the last two arrangements. These arrangements usually decrease national incomes of
advanced countries. In the first two cases, exporting countries are asked to limit the amount of
export. In contrast to the import restrictions by advanced countries, tariff revenues and the rent from
quotas will accrue to self-restricting exporting countries rather than to protectionistic importing
countries. The national income as well as the national welfare of the country that requests such
restrictive devices will decline.
Therefore, unless one refers to conflict of interest among domestic groups, it is hard to explain
the motives for these arrangements of new protectionism. For the case of the VIEs again, the
national welfare of the exporting country that requests such an arrangement will decline. In other
words, if the United States imposes quotas on Japan's imports of American cars, the loss to American
consumers of cars usually exceeds the gain in profits to American auto-makers.
As Figure 3 illustrates, in terms of national interest, small countries have little incentive to take
the protectionistic policy. In reality, however, many developing countries have high duties. Also, a
large country does not impose monopolistic tariffs. The United States as a nation will lose if it asks
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its trading partners to adopt the VERs. In reality the United States insists that its trading partners
agree on the VERs. (The VIEs also distort the offer curve and national welfare of the partner country
deteriorates. VERs make the partner choose a preferable point on the original offer curve, but VIEs
force him to choose an inferior point.) These examples show that nations are not negotiating for their
well-defined, unique, "national" interest.
To repeat, only by introducing the element of domestic conflict into the analysis of international
economic negotiations (Putnam, 1988; Evans, Jacobson, and Putnam, 1993; Grossman and Helpman,
1994), in other words, only by combining the "Second Image" approach with the "Third Image"
approach, can one fully account for the present state of international political economy. Interest
groups in a domestic economy can exert influence strong enough to realize an economic outcome
unfavorable to the national economy. Of course, if a nation can have a non-myopic perspective,
opposing groups may reach some reconciliation for the benefit of national income. For this purpose
as well, a relatively calm economic and political environment that leads to more (time) patient group
behavior will be helpful.
The degree to which the two-level approach is indispensable for explaining the conditions of the
present world differs from topic to topic. For issues in which the interests of various groups within a
country differ greatly, the layers of interests at the international and at the domestic level are
important. First, trade issues and the choice of a trade regime are the most relevant areas for the
two-level concept because strong conflicts of interest exist concerning trade liberalization between
producers and consumers, and between exporters and importers. Here the interests of groups interact
like cross-fire over the ocean. For example, Japanese automobile makers have much in common with
American consumers, and American farmers have much in common with Japanese consumers.
Producers' interests tend to be more than proportionately represented in the political process. This
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asymmetry drives the world to the protectionistic situation as a prisoners' dilemma outcome. Second,
domestic conflicts of interest certainly affect international cooperation in environmental protection, but
to a lesser degree. Since environmental protection exhibits external economies, national negotiations
may lead to an outcome short of sufficient preservation. Therefore, the existence of environmental
pressure groups in each country will help the international Nash equilibrium approach the Pareto
optimal situation. Conversely, strong opposition from industrial groups may deter a desirable
international environmental agreement. Third, in international monetary coordination, the effect
differences in the interests of the treasury, central bank, and industrial circles (Putnam, 1988;
Henning, 1994) are more subtle than in trade.
In this case, the balance of power between the Treasury Department (Ministry of Finance in some
countries) and the Central Bank could affect the degree of monetary coordination and the choice of
the monetary regimes. Putnam (1988) describes how the balance of influence between the German
Finance Ministry and Bundesbank was affected in favor of the Ministry's expansionary position when
international coordination of macroeconomic policies after the Bonn Summit, where "locomotive,"
theory of international coordination was coined. One of the reasons Japan's economy fell into a
prolonged recession could be traced to the continuation of the very low interest rate policy during
'

1987 to 1989. The policy was taken in order to, or by the excuse to, sustain the dollar to fulfill
Japan's commitment to international policy coordination.
To summarize, the domestic political structure in the United States does not seem to allow the
attainment of the first best solution for the United States as a nation. Similarly, other countries are
bound by internal domestic conflicts. In case of trade, lobbying pressures from import competing
industries, such as the American automobile industries and Japanese farmers, restrict the "win set,"
that is, the set of negotiation outcomes that sustain the political stability of the incumbent party.
Without consideration of these domestic factors, the present situation would be more difficult to

31

interpret. If there is a hegemon that has a transcendent power, it might be capable of mitigating the
impasse created by domestic economic conflicts. Thus, political leadership by a hegemon may be a
means of widening the "win set" by reducing uncertainty (for the role of uncertainty in the two-level
game, see Iida, 1993), by changing the perception of pressure groups, or by creating credible
threats. 11

7. The Prospect for the Future
When a hegemon begins to lose its power or its relative scale in the world, what kind of
consequences follow? This is our main question.
In our opinion, any country, hegemon or not, should be regarded as selfish or rational any time.
The consequences of rationality depends on the relative size of a nation to others as well as on the
situation in which a country is located. The United States could have been a (partially) altruistic
hegemon because her selfish behavior happened to coincide with the adequate supply of international
public goods. In any situation we need a careful study of incentive structures for nations and domestic
groups in order to explain the course of events in international political economy.
Instead of repeating our main messages that were summarized in the introductory section, let as
end this paper by referring to the role of regionalism for the future course of the world political
economy. I discuss the two examples, the international monetary regime and the international trade
regime with some short references to the system of foreign aid. Here again we emphasize the
distinction between the strategic interaction with respect to public goods and that in private goods.
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If a country is not a democratic country where vested interests compete by means of political or
economic (bribery) processes, the nature of a non-democratic political system, such as dictatorship, may
affect the trade policy. According to McGuire and Olson (1995), intensity of trade or openness of the
economy may influence the need for and the availability of tariff revenues. The interaction of domestic
political system and trade policy would thus be modified if a country is ruled by a dictator.)
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When a hegemon begins to lose her prominence, what are the adequate mechanism for the world
to supply the adequate amount of international public goods and under what conditions will the next
hegemon emerge? Keohane (1984) proposed an answer to the first question that a world system or
regime may emerge by the combination of rational choices of nations, and by the inertia from the pax
americana the world may continue to be a viable system for some length of time. Snidal (1985)
applies a k-stability theory to the problem and argues that a group of nations can be motivated to
supply an adequate amount of international public goods.
The case of the international regime illustrates the case where the public good that the incumbent
hegemon provides may not be the one the next challenger will provide. The choice of the
international money, or the existence of the international money, is a public good, though the
international money in your wallet is a private good. In other words, money, or more precisely the
use of a common money, has a public good character. Like language, money is used because others
accept the same money. Here the competition of monies such as the Pound Sterling, the Dollar, the
Deutch Mark and the Yen is to be analyzed by analogy to the competition between languages or, even
better, computer languages. A wider use of a certain computer language has strategic advantage
because of the network externalities (e.g. Katz and Shapiro, 1985). Monies can then be called
'differentiated international public goods.' A wider use of a currency facilitates further its
international use. As argued by Hayek (1984), a country with a more stable monetary and fiscal
policy will be able to provide a desired international money. Currently, the world seems to have
developed a doubt whether the U.S. fiscal policy is an adequate policy to give foreigners to hold the
dollar as an international money.
Because of the public good character of money, it is hard to take over the incumbent international
currency. However, once another currency reaches the stage when its characteristic is attractive
enough, the process of money selection may have the nature of a catastrophe in a dynamic nonlinear

33

model (Krugman, 1984). The transition to another currency will occur like an avalanche.
The applicability of k-stability theory can be tested by the process of the European monetary
unification. First, the question remains whether European countries can agree and succeed to achieve
a monetary unification as a club good. Second, if the unification is realized, does it provide a public
good to the world? The answer is negative except for the spillover effect to travelers and traders
living outside Europe. The road from a club good or a regional public good to an international public
good is still remote.
In passing, the case of the foreign aid is interesting. For example, Japan already exceeded the
United States of amount to the aid to developing countries. In this domain, the maintenance of the
world stability by reducing poorer nations can be a common goal for any country. Therefore, unlike
the international money, the United States and Japan, among others, are providing the same public
goods. Thus the analysis of Olson and Zeckhaser (1966) applies more naturally. However, after a
while it may turn out that the international order that the United States envisions differs from the
international order Japan or Germany envisions. Then the burden sharing game of the foreign aid
will change its character into a competitive aid for the donor's political control.
Let us now turn to the trade regime. We have already mentioned the changing attitude of the
United States by VERs and VIEs. In addition, we observe the move towards regionalism. The
benefit-cost structure in economic integration will be derived from the model discussed in Section 4.
The European Union, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and a looser union like
the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) can be interpreted thus as a move for creating clubs
and club goods. These movements are beneficial for those who join the union, because of the trade
creation effect, but those outside the union may lose because of the trade diversion effect. In other
words, trade will be created within a region with lower internal trade barriers, while trade with
outside the region will be reduced because nations tend to buy more from nations within the region.
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The welfare of the world can be affected negatively through trade diversion effect in spite of a clause
like the GATI Article 24 that restricts the use of increased bargaining power of a free trade area or a
custom union. 12
The public goods providing capacity of international organization like the WTO is curtailed by the
"selfish" bilateral behavior of a declining hegemon. In this case, the United States erodes the system
of international public goods. Or, as in the case of NAFTA and APEC, the hegemon is trying to
strengthen its potentially declining position by enlarging the domain of economic activities under her
influence. The United States is attempting to forge an "augumented hegemon," or "fortified
hegemon." There is a gap between the phenomenon of regional agreements and the argument of k
stability. The k-stability talks about the creation of international public goods, which is in this.
Only if these regional movements facilitate the establishment of an overall free trade regime for the
world, can they be considered as a step towards the adequate supply of international public goods.

12

GATT 24 forbids that a custom union or free trade members increase their tariff rates against the
rest of the world after integration. For the economic implication of this clause see Goto & Hamada
(1995).
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TABLE 1
Relative Shares of Nations
A. GDP
..

Share (GDP)

1960
52.24%
4.51%
7.35%
6.18%
7.88%
4.03%
100.00%
985.32

U.S.
Japan
U.K.
France
Germany
Italy
OECD
billion$

1980
33.55%
13.12%
6.66%
8.23%
10.81%
5.61%
100.00%
8072.60

1970
46.02%
9.27%
5.64%
6.50%
9.05%
4.89%

100.00%
2197.99

1990
32.77%
17.50%
5.82%
7.14%
9.66%
6.54%
100.00%
16753.82

1993
32.73%
22.04%
4.92%
6.55%
9.99%
5.18%
100.00%
19123.52

B. Trade
Share (export)

u.s,
Japan
U.K:
France
Germany
Italy
World
(billion$)

1950
18.0%
1.4%
11.1%
5.4%
3.5%
2.1%
100.0%
57.1

1960
18.0%
3.5%
9.3%
6.0%
10.0%
3.2%
100.0%
114.6

1950
16.3%
1.6%
12.4%
5.2%
4.6%
2.5%
100.0%
59.0

1960
13.6%
3.7%
10.8%
5.2%
8.5%
3.9%
100.0%
120.2

1970
14.5%

-1980
11.9%
6.9%

1990
11.8%

8.6%
5.6%
6.5%
12.3%
5.1%
100.0%

1994
12.2%
9.4%

6.6%
6.6%
6.1%
11.7%

6.1%
10.2%

4.5%

4.5%

100.0%
293.4

100.0%
1,895.6

3,334.4

1970
13.7%
6.1%
7.1%
6.2%
9.7%
4.8%
100.0%
309.7

1980
12.9%
7.1%
5.8%
6.8%
9.5%
5.1%
100.0%
1,986.3

1990
15.0%
6.8%
6.5%
6.8%
10.0%
5.3%
100.0%
3,455.4

3.9%
100.0%
4,324.9

1980
0.10
-1.00
1.30
-0.60
-1.60
-2.30

1990
-1.70
1.20
-3.40
-0.80
3.20
-1.60

1994
-2.30
2.80
-0.10
0.70
-1.20
1.40

5.8%

4.9%

5.6%
10.0%
4.5%

100.0%
4,201.3

Share (import)
U.S.
Japan
U.K.
France
Germany
Italy
World
(billion $)

1994
15.9%
6.4%
5.2%
5.3%
8.6%

C. The Balance of Current Account
Current account (in percent of GDP)
U.S!.
Japan

u.K
France
Ger,many
Italy

'1960
0.56
0.32
-1.00
n.a

1.53
0.85

1970
0.24
0.98
1.60
0.04
0.46
0.90
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TABLE2
Tariff Averages Before and After the
Implementation of the Tokyo Round
Tariffs on Total Imports of
Finished and Semifinished
Manufactures
Country or Country Group

Pre-Tokyo

Post-Tokyo

Tariffs on Imports from
Developing Countries of
Finished and Semifinished
Manufactures
Pre-Tokyo

Post-Tokyo

European Community
Weighted

8.3

6.0

8.9

6.7

Simple

9.4

6.6

8.5

5.8

Weighted

10.0

5.4

10.0

6.8

Simple

10.8

6.4

11.0

6.7

Weighted

7.0

4.9

11.4

8.7

Simple

11.6

6.6

12.0

6.7

Japan

United States

Weighted: Trade Weighted Average
Simple:
Simple Average

Source: World Bank, 1987

46

TABLE3
Imports Subject to Nontariff Barriers, 1983
(Percent)

Textile & Clothing
Country
or
Group

Total

From
Industrial
Countries

Manufacturing

From
Developing
Countries

Total

From
Industrial
Countries

From
Developing
Countries

United States

57.0

31.1

64.0

17.1

16.5

18.6

European Community

52.0

15.6

68.9

18.7

15.2

29.9

Japan

11.8

11.0

13.0

7.7

9.7

4.4

Source: Goto, 1989
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TABLE4
Industrial Country Imports
Subject to "Hard-Core" NTBs,
1981 and 1986
(percent)

Source of Imports
Industrial Countries

Developing Countries

Importer

1981

1986

1981

1986

EC

10

13

22

23

Japan

29

29

22

22

United States

9

15

14

17

All Industrial
Countries

13

16

19

21

NOTE: "Hard-core" NTBs represent the NTBs that are most likely to have significant restrictive
effects. Hard-core NTBs include import prohibitions, quantitative restrictions, voluntary export
restraints, variable levies, MFA restrictions, and nonautomatic licensing.

Source:
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TABLES
Import Coverage Index of a Subgroup
of NTBs Applied by Selected Industrial Market Economies,
1981-1986
(1981 == 100)

NTBs (Hard-Core)
Importer

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

Austria

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

99.3

Canada

108.6

106.0

108.4

112.1

121.3

EC*

105.7

110.9

113.9

120.8

118.3

Finland

102.5

102.5

102.5

101.0

101.0

Japan

99.2

99.2

99.2

99.2

98.6

New Zealand

100.0

100.0

100.0

92.6

86.1

Norway

101.1

96.4

94.4

86.6

85.3

Switzerland

100.4

100.4

100.8

100.8

100.8

United States

105.5

105.6

112.1

119.2

123.0

104.6

107.1

110.2

115.3

115.8

All

*Excluding Portugal and Spain

Source: World Bank, 1995
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